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THE INDEFENSIBLE DEFENSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY:
EXCUSING LOCALITIES FROM THE PERFORMANCE
OF STATE-MANDATED DUTIES
STEPHAN LANDSMAN*
I. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILrrY1
B ETWEEN 1968 AND 1970, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO, was in difficult
financial straits. Budgetary requests for fiscal year 1970 totalled
$17,161,000 while available resources totalled only $13,800,000.2 One of the
most expensive items in the budget during this period was the county's share
of public assistance costs. This share had been certified by the Ohio
Department of Public Welfare as $2,013,000 for fiscal year 1969, and was
expected to be $2,416,000 for fiscal year 1970.3 In addition to the certified
amount, the county was expected to pay $351,000 into the Public Assistance
Fund to liquidate a deficit that had accumulated in 1968. Motivated by the
monetary troubles of the county, the Franklin County Commissioners chose
to appropriate neither the $2,013,000 required for welfare expenditures in
1969 nor the $351,000 owing from 1968. 4 It would appear that payment into
the Public Assistance Fund was the only state-mandated fiscal obligation
repudiated by Franklin County.5 The county commissioners' refusal to
appropriate the specified sums clearly violated the Ohio Public Welfare law.6
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, A.B. Kenyon College,
1969; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1972. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance
of Monica Lercher, third year student at Cleveland-Marshall.
I The doctrine of impossibility discussed in this article was delineated by the Ohio Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Ohio St. 2d 62, 255 N.E.2d 244
(1970). The doctrine appears to have had its roots in contract principles. See note 87 infra and
accompanying text. For the precise meaning of the doctrine, see notes 5 and 19 infra and
accompanying text.
2 Agreed Statement of Facts, §§ 11 + 13, State ex rel. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs,
21 Ohio St. 2d 62, 255 N.E.2d 244 (1970).
3 Id. at §§ 4 & 12. The amount certified to the Board of County Commissioners for 1969 was
$2,013,036; the 1968 deficit was $351,049.81. For purposes of this discussion, all such figures in the
text are given to the nearest thousand.
4 21 Ohio St. 2d at 63, 255 N.E.2d at 245.
5 There is no indication in the opinion, pleadings, briefs or other papers in Brown that any
other state-mandated obligation was not met. From all the facts it would appear that funds were
available to pay the mandated sum. See notes 12-13 infra. Under these circumstances, refusal to
pay should be classified as a repudiation of the debt. See Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment
and the Supreme Court, 46 YALE L. J. 199, 201 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Debt
Adjustment].
6 Act of July 15, 1965, § 5101.161, 1965 Ohio Laws 1208 (current version at Otno REV. CODE
ANN. § 5101.161 (Page Supp. 1977)), provided in part:
Prior to December sixteenth, annually, the department of public welfare shall certify
to the board of county commissioners of each county the amount estimated by the
department to be needed in the following calendar year to meet the county share, as
defined in section 5101.16 of the Revised Code, of expenditures for aid, health care, and
administration under Chapters 5105., 5106., 5107., 5113., and 5151. of the Revised Code.
At the beginning of the fiscal year the board of county commissioners shall appropriate
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Pursuant to the explicit requirement of the Ohio Revised Code,7 the
Attorney General brought an action in mandamus before the Supreme Court
of Ohio,8 seeking to compel the county commissioners to appropriate the
sums that had not been paid into the Public Assistance Fund.9 After
commencement of the action, the commissioners appropriated the $2,013,000
county share of public assistance costs for 1969; however, they refused to
appropriate the $351,000 needed to discharge the 1968 deficit.' 0 The
commissioners asserted that no funds were available for such an appropria-
tion and that if the county were forced to expend the sum in issue, a wide
range of county government operations would have to be curtailed."
The parties entered into an Agreed Statement of Facts which, according to
the court, demonstrated that if the writ of mandamus were granted "the
offices of the commissioners, auditor, treasurer, recorder, sheriff, coroner, and
engineer would be curtailed to such an extent that it would be impossible for
them to perform their statutory duties."' 2
Justice Corrigan, speaking for a unanimous court, denied the writ of
mandamus. He found upon the stipulated facts that there was a conflict
between state-mandated obligations which on the one hand compelled
payment into the Public Assistance Fund and on the other hand allegedly
required the county to make other use of the same resources.'3 The court
the amount certified by the department, reduced or increased by the amount of the
balance or deficit in the public assistance fund at the end of the fiscal year. The attorney
general shall bring mandamus proceedings against any board which fails to make such
an appropriation.
The current version of section 5101.161 does not differ materially from the text quoted here and
considered in the Brown case.
7 See note 6 supra.
1 State ex rel. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Ohio St. 2d 62 255 N.E.2d 244 (1970).
9 Id. at 63-64, 255 N.E.2d at 245.
10 Id. at 63, 255 N.E.2d at 245.
1 Id. at 64, 255 N.E.2d at 245.
12 Id. This characterization of the Agreed Statement of Facts is open to challenge. Paragraph
15 of the Statement indicates that the 1970 budgetary requests "mandated under Ohio law" in
Franklin County totalled $9,259,000; paragraph 11 specifies a total county income of $13,800,000.
This information indicates that an appropriation of $351,000 could have been made without
disrupting any budgetary request "mandated under Ohio law." The court's characterization of
the county's financial status was based only on the last two paragraphs of the Statement:
(17) That were the Franklin County Commissioners called to testify in this cause,
they would say that if they are mandamused to appropriate $351,049.81 to the Public
Assistance Fund covering the deficit at the end of the fiscal year 1968, they would be
compelled to reduce the budgets of the Franklin County Commissioners, Auditor,
Treasurer, Recorder, Sheriff, Coroner, and Engineer.
(18) That were the Franklin County Commissioners, Auditor, Treasurer,
Recorder, Sheriff, Coroner, and Engineer called to testify in this cause, they would say
that if their budgets for the year 1969 were further reduced by the County
Commissioners, they would not be able to perform the statutory and mandatory duties
of their respective offices.
13 21 Ohio St. 2d at 64, 255 N.E.2d at 245. The court's conclusion that Franklin county was
compelled by state law to use all available funds to finance state-mandated duties other than
public assistance is not warranted by the Statement of Facts in the case. As indicated in note 12,
supra, approximately $4,550,000 was spent by Franklin County in 1970 for non-mandated
budgetary items. The court did not indicate why these funds could not be used to pay the Public
Assistance Fund mandate. It should also be noted that the court did not consider whether
Franklin County was utilizing its taxing and other revenue generating capacity to the fullest
extent possible in an effort to generate needed income. Prior Ohio Supreme Court opinions have
[Vol. 27:47
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concluded that this conflict was not appropriate for judicial resolution. The
court apparently classified the problem as a political question, one that could
only be resolved by the Ohio General Assembly. 4
In reaching its conclusion, the court indicated some reliance on State ex rel.
Motter v. Atkinson.15 Examination of this case, however, suggests that it does
not support the court's argument. In Atkinson the probate court judge of
Vinton County brought an action against the county commissioners, based on
their failure to appropriate funds needed to finance the state-mandated
operations of the probate court. The commissioners claimed that the county
had insufficient funds to meet the needs of the probate court and to keep other
county offices open.' 6 The supreme court dismissed the commissioners'
argument and held that the state spending requirement had to be honored.
The court rejected the argument that competing fiscal needs are an adequate
basis for a county's refusal to carry out state law, stating that
[t]he hardship, if any, visited upon the operation of the other county
offices through lack of funds resulting from the appropriation of the
amounts requested by the probate judge for the operation of his
offices, is a matter over which this court has no control, but is wholly
within the province of the General Assembly. 7
The Brown decision stood the Atkinson holding on its head. Rather than
compel expenditure and require the General Assembly to resolve the conflict
as had been done in Atkinson, the Brown court refused to compel the
expenditure, and sent the Attorney General and those deprived of welfare
assistance to the legislature in search of an unspecified remedy. 8 The court's
decision in Brown undermined the General Assembly's decision to make
welfare expenditures obligatory. This result must be contrasted with that
reached in Atkinson, in which the mandate of the General Assembly was
enforced by the court and made subject to change only at the behest of the
General Assembly.
The Brown court did not rest its decision entirely upon the notion of an
inviolable "political question." In addition, it declared mandamus to be a
high prerogative writ to be granted only in the court's discretion, and then
refused to exercise that discretion. The basis for this denial was the conclusion
stated that municipalities are under a duty to demonstrate that they have exhausted all revenue-
generating resources before the court will even consider relief from state mandated duties. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Southard v. City of Van Wert, 126 Ohio St. 78, 184 N.E. 12 (1932). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 91-97 infra, and accompanying text.
14 21 Ohio St. 2d at 64, 255 N.E.2d at 245.
11 "Such a conflict in the statutory law does not readily lend itself to resolution by the courts
but, as we indicated in State ex rel. Motter v. Atkinson, 146 Ohio St. 11, 16, 63 N.E.2d 440,442-43
(1945) is a question 'wholly within the province of the General Assembly.' "21 Ohio St. 2d at 64.
11 146 Ohio St. at 14, 63 N.E.2d at 442.
17 Id. at 15-16, 63 N.E.2d at 442.
18 What more the General Assembly could do in the Brown case is unclear. It had already
absolutely mandated county appropriations to meet welfare costs. The only alternative open to
the General Assembly would seem to have been the scrapping of the entire state welfare
structure. Such a step would have been extremely time consuming. One cannot help but be
skeptical of the capability of the General Assembly to produce a short term solution to the
pressing problems faced by beneficiaries of the Public Assistance Fund in Franklin County.
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that the issuance of the writ "would require the respondent to perform acts
which are impossible to perform because of a lack of funds."' 9 The court cited
one case in support of its acceptance of this "impossibility" defense, State ex
rel. Burgess v. Crabbe.21 Crabbe involved the attempt of the liquidator of a
bankrupt British insurance company to recover the proceeds of a fund the
company had deposited with the State of Ohio in order to do business in the
state. The liquidator sought to compel the Attorney General and the
Superintendent of Insurance to bring an action to determine the rights of
policy holders with potential claims against the fund.2' The court refused the
writ, reasoning that all such claims had not as yet matured and that it was
therefore impossible to finally determine the rights of all interested parties.22
The relevance of the Crabbe decision to Franklin County's dilemma
seems extremely slight. There was no hint in Crabbe that the doctrine of
impossibility could be applied to excuse a government entity from carrying
out a mandatory duty. In fact, Crabbe required the insurance company to
carry out its state-mandated obligation to maintain an insurance fund on
deposit in Ohio. Crabbe barred the dissolution of the fund, thereby
effectuating state law. The Brown opinion sought to justify an opposite result:
the expenditure of funds notwithstanding the requirements of state law.
Crabbe prevented repudiation, of state law, Brown endorsed it. For these
reasons it would appear that the court's use of the Crabbe case is open to the
most serious challenge.
The precedent established in Brown was shortly thereafter relied upon by
the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Johns v. Board of County
Commissioners23 to excuse the commissioners of Richland County from the
state-mandated duty to construct or finance a juvenile detention facility. The
court held in a per curiam opinion that the county commissioners' claim that
the county was "operating at its maximum debt limit and that they [were]
without funds sufficient to provide a juvenile detention home or provide for its
maintenance and operation"2 4 established a good defense to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. The supreme court reiterated the principle that
"impossibility of performance is a viable defense,"2 5 and remanded the case
for the taking of evidence on the issue of impossibility.
In 1976, Summit County, Ohio, found itself in an economic position
comparable to that of Franklin County between 1968 and 1970.26 Following
19 State ex rel. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Ohio St. 2d at 65,255 N.E.2d at 246. It
should be noted that the "impossibility" involved in this case was not absolute. Franklin County
did not face insolvency. Rather, it faced some difficult fiscal choices in the allocation of its
resources. It chose to refuse payment of one particular obligation in order to free funds for other
purposes. See note 5 supra.
20 114 Ohio St. 517, 151 N.E. 759 (1926).
21 Id. at 518-19, 151 N.E. at 759.
22 Id. at 521-22, 151 N.E. at 760.
2, 29 Ohio St. 2d 6, 278 N.E. 2d 19 (1972).
24 Id. at 7, 278 N.E. 2d at 20.
25 Id. at 8, 278 N.E. 2d at 21.
21 See Robinson v. Rhodes, 424 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law at 4-6, Cain v. Birkel, No. 76-4-0988 (Ohio C.P., Summit County, June 15,
1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Decision & Journal Entry, Cain v. Birkel, No. 8204 (Ohio Ct.
App., 9th Dist., Sept. 1976).
[Vol. 27:47
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the example of the Franklin County Commissioners in Brown, the Summit
County Commissioners refused to appropriate their full share of general
relief27 costs. Although the Ohio Department of Public Welfare had certified
$2,780,000 as the county's share, the commissioners appropriated only
$654,000.28 The result of this action was the suspension of public assistance
payments to all Summit County residents who had been recipients of general
relief.29 Apparently relying upon the holding in Brown, the Ohio Attorney
General refused to initiate a mandamus action against the county commissio-
ners.30 Faced with absolute deprivation of public assistance, general relief
recipients in Summit County commenced an action in mandamus31 to force
the commissioners to make the necessary appropriation. The Court of
Common Pleas dismissed the recipients' claim in Cain v. Birkel,32 holding that
they had no standing to challenge the commissioners' actions, and that the
county was entitled to assert the defense of impossibility.33 The court of
appeals affirmed that part of the original decision denying the recipients
standing.3 4 On the issue of impossibility, the court of appeals ruled that
adequate proof had not been presented.35
Hence it would appear that in Ohio today fiscally hard-pressed localities36
21 While Ohio statutes refer to this program as "poor relief", both the Robinson and Cain
opinions use the more commonly employed term, "general relief." The terms are interchangea-
ble.
Otio REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.01 (Page 1970) provides:
"Poor relief" means food, clothing, public or private shelter, the services of a physician
or surgeon, dental care, hospitalization, and other commodities and services necessary
for the maintenance of health and decency.
Poor relief may be given in cash, by order, or both, and shall be inalienable whether
by way of assignment, charge, or otherwise, and exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or other like process. Local relief authorities shall not disburse funds through any
private organization. Poor relief may be given to persons living in their own homes or
other suitable quarters, but not to persons living in a county home, city infirmary, jail, or
tuberculosis sanitorium or to children who are not living with their parents, guardians, or
other persons standing in place of parents.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03 (Page 1970) provides:
Poor relief shall be given on a budgetary basis and shall be sufficient to maintain health
and decency, taking into account the requirements and the income and resources of the
recipient. The receipt of other forms of public assistance shall not prevent the receipt of
poor relief if additional need exists.
21 See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 2, Cain v. Birkel, No. 76-4-0988 (Ohio C.P.
Summit County, June 15,1976), afi'd in part and rev'd in part, Decision & Journal Entry, Cain v.
Birkel, No. 8204 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Sept. 1976).
29 Robinson v. Rhodes, 424 F. Supp. 1183,1186 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Decision & Journal Entry at
2, Cain v. Birkel, No. 8204 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Sept. 1976).
30 See Decision & Journal Entry at 6, Cain v. Birkel, No. 8204 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Sept.
1976).
31 Id. at 2-3.
32 No. 76-4-0988 (Ohio C.P., Summit County, June 15, 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
No. 8204 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Sept. 1976).
33 Id.
34 Decision & Journal Entry at 6, Cain v. Birkel No. 8204 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Sept. 1976).
35 Id. at 7.
3' The "localities" upon which this Article focuses are the counties, municipalities, and other
political subdivisions established by the State to carry out governmental functions at the local
level.
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may be able to avoid state-mandated obligations by relying on a claim of
impossibility. While the law in this area is not settled, it would seem that the
mandatory programs most vulnerable to attack are those providing benefits to
the impoverished or the young.37 The remainder of this Article will analyze
the doctrine of impossibility and review the scope of judicial authority to
compel local participation in mandated programs.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL INADEQUACY OF
TiH DOCrHiNE OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Before turning to an examination of the impossibility doctrine and the
Brown case, it will be helpful to canvass some of the principles governing
relations between state and local governments in Ohio and elsewhere. At
common law, states have been viewed as having plenary power over local
government entities.3 8 Under this view the state may act at any time to create
or destroy any locality. 9 The notion that there is an inherent right to local self-
government10 has been rejected throughout the United States. 41
Local government entities have faired no better under the United States
Constitution than at common law. The United States Supreme Court has held
that the due process, 42 equal protection,43 and contract clauses44 of the
Constitution do not limit state dominion over localities. The taxing power of a
subdivision is "subordinate to the unrestrained power of the state."45 The
Federal Constitution inhibits state authority over localities only when that
authority is exercised to achieve an otherwise unconstitutional purpose.4
Absent alteration of common law by state statutes or state constitution,
therefore, localities are mere agents of the state.47 They are convenient
3' These programs would appear most vulnerable because the specific holding of the Ohio
Supreme Court in Brown and Johns have authorized repudiation of obligations involving
assistance to welfare recipients and juveniles.
38 See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48
MINN. L. REV. 643,646 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Power]; Note, Conflicts Between
State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HAsv. L. REV. 737 (1959).
39 See, e.g., Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509 (1942); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
40 See, Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REv.
737, 737 n.2 (1959).
41 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923); State ex rel. Toledo v.
Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
42 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
43 See, e.g., City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923).
44 See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); City of Safety Harbor v.
Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally, Schulz, The Effect of the Contract Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment Upon the Power of the States to Control Municipal
Corporations, 36 MicH. L. REV. 385 (1938).
I- Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509 (1942).
4' See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (racially discriminatory effect
achieved by the realignment of municipal boundaries held unlawful).
47 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186 (1923); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); State ex rel. McElroy v. City of Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189,194,
181 N.E.2d 26, 30 (1962); State ex rel. Ranz v. City of Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 477,482-83,45
N.E.2d 767, 770 (1942).
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administrative units created to execute state policy in particular geographic
areas.48 Their sole function is to implement state law.
The majority of states, including Ohio, have altered the common law rule
concerning local authority by adopting various kinds of "home rule"
provisions. 49 Such provisions virtually never result in local autonomy,5" but
rather grant localities the power to exercise certain governmental
prerogatives without the prior authorization of the state legislature, or limit
state regulation of matters of purely local concern. 51 The result usually has
been a sharing of authority between the state and the local governments.
Generally, home rule has not barred state activities which require local
implementation or administration.
52
When a conflict53 arises between the activities of a home rule locality and
state legislation, the latter generally has prevailed, particularly when the
matter is one of statewide concern.54 The state does not surrender its
sovereignty when there is a home rule provision; it remains the sovereign and
its authority is paramount. 5 The holding in Brown is not consistent with these
41 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,575 (1964); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
182, 187 (1923).
41 For a discussion of the meaning of the term home rule, see Municipal Power, supra note 38,
at 644-46. The constitutions of at least 28 states, including Ohio, contain home rule provisions. Id.
at 645.
10 See Municipal Power, supra note 38 at 645.
-' Id. at 648. See, e.g., Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3, which provides: "Municipalities have the
authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws."
52 See GRAD, THE STATE's CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO URBAN PROBLEMS reprinted in THE STATE
AND THE URBAN CRISIS, 49 (A. Campbell ed. 1970), reprinted in VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 119 (1975).
53 As set forth in Ohio Const. art. XVHI, § 3, municipalities may "adopt and enforce such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." Defining the
point at which a "conflict" arises between state law and local activity is not an easy task in Ohio.
For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the Police
Power in Ohio, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 29 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Vaubel]. At a minimum, a conflict
exists where there is a"head-on collision." See, e.g., Struthersv. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263,140N.E.
519 (1923) ("Conflict" not found unless a municipal ordinance declares something to be right that
the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa). Even when there is no technical "conflict," a
divergence requiring adjustment may be found as a result of state preemption. See, e.g., Stary
v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954) (Local ordinance upheld upon a finding that
specific state statutes did not preempt the entire field of trailer park regulation); Ferrie v.
Sweeny, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1946) (Local ordinance providing money for day-
care centers preempted by state intent to occupy the entire field of child welfare). But see
Vaubel, supra, at 46-50.
54 In general, local activity will only prevail over state law if the activity has "no effect on
citizens of the state living outside the municipality." Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and
Municipal Ordinances, 72 HAiv. L. REV. 737, 741 (1959). In Ohio, issues deemed to be of
statewide concern and therefore beyond local interference include: poor relief, State ex rel. Ranz
v. Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 477,45 N.E.2d 767 (1942); public education, Niehaus v. State ex rel.
Board of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924); public health and pollution control, City of
Bucyrus v. State Department of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); and child care,
Ferrie v. Sweeny, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1946). For a somewhat different
interpretation of these cases, see Vaubel supra note 53.
55 The Ohio Supreme Court has been quite emphatic on this point. See, e.g., Neihaus v. State
ex rel. Board of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924); State ex rel. Taylor v. French,
96 Ohio St. 172,184,117 N.E. 173,176 (1917). See also F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS
ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN ARArs, 349-50 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MICHELMAN & SANDALOW].
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concepts of home rule and state primacy. The doctrine of impossibility
accepted in Brown authorizes unrestricted repudiation of state mandates as
long as there has been some showing of fiscal hardship. Brown permits
localities to choose the programs they will continue and the ones they will
terminate. Programs of statewide applicability thus may be nullified.
In addition to undermining state sovereignty, an interpretation of the law
that exalts local concerns over statewide interests can seriously damage the
effectiveness of government programs. For example, experience has shown
that the quality of public assistance programs suffers when they are provided
in a piecemeal or uncoordinated fashion. As early as the nineteenth century,
John Stuart Mill noted the danger inherent in allowing localities to deal
separately and independently with the impoverished. Mill foresaw that as a
result of economic difficulties or simple mismanagement, some localities
would become "nest[s] of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into other
localities and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole
laboring community."56 The importance of central coordination of public
relief was widely ignored in America until the 1930's when the economic
depression caused the collapse of local public assistance schemes. In the
ensuing effort to place relief on a firmer footing, the states and the federal
government were compelled to assume the burden of managing the public
assistance structure.57 The Brown decision fails to respect these historical and
administrative considerations. It allows localities to evade responsibilities
imposed upon them as part of the state's centralized relief plan, and thereby
undermines the social welfare structure.
In State ex rel. Ranz v. City of Youngstown 5 decided before the Brown
case, the Ohio Supreme Court had recognized both the need for state control
over the relief-giving apparatus and the fact that the state had taken such
control through its welfare laws. In the second paragraph of the syllabus of
Ranz, the court stated, "[r]elief of the poor is a state function."5 9 The Ranz
court recognized the authority of the state to establish the administrative and
financial arrangements necessary to insure continuing relief for the poor.
Deciding that a taxpayer could not successfully challenge a state-mandated
financing scheme for public assistance on the grounds that city poor relief was
financed solely by county funds,60 the court held that a county government is a
creature of the state, "a wholly subordinate political division or instrumentali-
ty for serving the state."'"
The decision in Brown cannot be harmonized easily with that in Ranz.
Brown authorizes county repudiation of state welfare spending mandates;
"0 On Liberty, first published in 1859, as quoted in MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 55, at
218.
57 See F. PivE. & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE PooR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 45-
77(1971).
5 140 Ohio St. 477, 45 N.E.2d 767 (1942).
-9 Id. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
60 140 Ohio St. 477, 45 N.E.2d 767 (1942).
61 Id. The Ranz court distinguished municipalities invested with home rule powers from
counties which have not adopted charters or alternative forms of government, finding such
counties creatures of state policy created to execute state mandates. The issue of special county
fealty to the state was not considered by the court in Brown; it is a point that weakens county
claims of a right to repudiate state mandates.
[Vol. 27:47
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this is at odds with the classification in Ranz of the county as an entity created
specifically to effectuate state policies, including provisions for the poor.62
Such repudiation is antithetical to the Ranz holding that the provision of relief
is a state function which is to be carried out by counties as the state directs. As
a result, Brown undermines the ability of the state to develop and to maintain
an orderly system for public assistance. It grants counties a measure of
sovereignty over public welfare programs never authorized in state law,
thereby crippling the statewide welfare structure which was fashioned to
meet modem public assistance needs.63
In addition to diminishing the effectiveness of welfare programs
throughout Ohio, the Brown decision encourages a political Balkanization of
the state by allowing localities to wall themselves off from surrounding areas
and by investing local leaders with the power to override state priorities.
Modem political experience indicates that state government is best suited
to deal with the general welfare of the populace because only at the state level
is there the breadth of opinion needed to harmonize the broad range of
competing political and social interests.6 4 The state legislature, drawn from
the widest geographical area and the broadest political base in the state,
should be able to avoid local bias in its deliberations better than any local
government entity.65 If the politically weak or unpopular members of a
community are to be protected from local oppression, state priorities must be
recognized and enforced. Otherwise, localities would be free to victimize the
unpopular. The local political process clearly did not serve to protect the
interests of welfare recipients effectively in Brown. The survival, on the local
level, of programs like the welfare program may well depend upon judicial
recognition of the primacy of the state in these matters.
Thus far consideration has focused on the programmatic and political
consequences of the holding in Brown. The decision is equally vulnerable
when analyzed in terms of the economic realities upon which state and local
governments are built. The state is at the heart of the financial structure of
government. The state is the sovereign, is vested with exclusive power to
authorize taxation, to determine the composition of taxing districts, to limit
levies, to restrict debt accumulation and to examine the financial affairs of
localities. 66 The chief asset of any locality is the taxing power granted to it by
the state. 67
The primacy of the state in financial affairs is reinforced by federal as well
62 140 Ohio St. at 483, 45 N.E.2d at 770-71.
' See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
"' See generally Municipal Power, supra note 38 at 710-12. Sandalow argues that "for certain
purposes, the municipality's political processes are less adequate than those at the state level."
Id. at 710. The reasons for the superiority of state processes include the larger number of voters
and interests active at the state level and the reduced likelihood of the existence of a homogeneous
population acting upon a shared prejudice. See also Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and
Municipal Ordinances, 72 HAHV. L. REv. 737 (1959).
65 See generally Municipal Power, supra note 38, at 710.
66 See Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933); State ex rel. City of
Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 119 N.E. 253 (1917); Municipal Debt Adjustment, supra note 5
at 212; Glander & Dewey, Municipal Taxation, A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine, 9 Omo ST.
L.J. 72, 84-86 (1948).
67 Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509 (1942).
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as state law. Article IX of the Bankruptcy Act68 vests the state with the absolute
discretion to control the availability of bankruptcy proceedings for
localities.69 No locality, no matter what its economic condition, can obtain
bankruptcy relief in federal court without state approval. This provision of
the Bankruptcy Act implicitly recognizes the plenary power of the state in
local fiscal affairs and the state authority to insist upon the fulfillment of state
mandates for spending. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
ceding less authority to the state would rob the state of its ability "to protect
the vital interests of the people by sustaining the public credit and maintaining
local government." 70
By permitting localities to decline to fulfill state-mandated obligations,
Brown vitiates state authority to control local expenditures. This judicially
created option for local repudiation is in direct conflict with the plenary
power of the state in matters of local finance, and conflicts with the generally
recognized proposition that the state in granting the taxing power can specify
the items to be paid for out of the taxes received.71
The ruling in Brown also serves to undermine the morale of officials
charged with enforcement of state fiscal mandates.72 One need look no further
than the refusal of the Ohio Attorney General to commence a mandamus
action against the Summit County Commissioners after they refused to
appropriate funds for general relief in 1976, for confirmation of this
proposition.
By freeing a locality to overspend on favored programs and then
repudiate other obligations, the Brown decision also opens the door to
irresponsible spending at the local level. Few creditors will fail to understand
the threat implicit in this situation once the claim of any creditor is defeated
because of alleged impossibility. In general, localities have not been
permitted to control their liability to creditors in contract, or to claimants in
tort.73 Local authority to regulate local liability has been viewed as an
invitation to abuses involving the avoidance of legitimate debts.7 1 In Ohio, as
elsewhere, local tort, contract and similar liability is governed by state law
rather than by local enactment.75 While Brown does not on its face empower
local officials to pick and choose the debts they will honor, it does open
avenues for abuse which have been assiduously avoided in the tort and
-s 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (Supp. 1977).
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 403 (Supp. 1977) (reservation to state of power to control governmental
functions of political subdivisions). See also United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938); Ashton
v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936); Mission Independent School
Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941); Note, Municipal
Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976).
70 Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 512 (1942).
71 Id. at 509.
72 See Municipal Debt Adjustment, supra note 5.
13 See generally Municipal Power, supra note 38 at 672-73; Municipal Debt Adjustment, supra
note 5, at 210-11.
74 See generally Note, The Constitutionality of the New York Municipal Wage Freeze and
Debt Moratorium: Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 167, 190 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Resurrection of the Contract Clause].
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contract contexts. 76 Since local fiscal manipulation can be exceedingly subtle,
the Brown decision seems to invite unscrupulous local officials to attempt to
juggle budgets in the hope of funding favored programs at the expense of
disfavored ones.
As a general rule, localities are not permitted to impose economic or
programmatic burdens upon the state government or its agents. 7  Local
initiatives that might unduly burden state administrators are restricted by this
principle so that state officials will be free to execute the tasks assigned to them
under state law and that the cost of carrying out local mandates will not
decrease the funds available for state activities. Cases like Brown can have the
indirect effect of imposing additional obligations on the state and its agents by
forcing the unsupported poor to seek out new homes in localities still
providing assistance and by increasing the administrative and related costs
which are borne by the state.78
The decision in Brown may have an even more direct impact on the state
fisc. In Robinson v. Rhodes,79 general relief recipients whose assistance
was suspended pursuant to the action of the Summit County Commissioners"0
sought injunctive relief in federal court to compel the State of Ohio to finance
the general relief program in Summit County. The recipients in Robinson
argued that general relief was a state program required to be in effect in all
parts of Ohio"' and that Summit county was the agent of the state for' the
purpose of providing relief.82 Because general relief was a state-run program
available throughout Ohio, the recipients asserted that its suspension in any
locality denied those affected the equal protection of the laws as well as rights
guaranteed under state law. 3 The federal district court held that both state
law and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution had
been violated by the cut-off.84 The court ordered the Ohio Department of
Public Welfare to assume "the administration of the general relief program"
and "to pay the entire cost of general relief in said county from the State's
appropriation for relief."8 The seed sown in Brown bore fruit in Robinson;
71 Id. See also Wilson v. City of East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929);
Resurrection of the Contract Clause, supra note 74, at 187-91.
77 See Municipal Power, supra note 38, at 679-83.
71 Counties providing public assistance are carrying out a state function. See State ex rel.
Ranz v. City of Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 477,491,45 N.E.2d 767,774 (1942). Thus, any increase
in a county welfare budget caused by the failure of another locality to pay its share of welfare
costs involves the imposition of additonal expense on an agent of the state executing a state
function. It should also be noted that certain types of welfare assistance payments vary
depending on the locality in which they are dispensed. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5106.01 (Page
1970). A recipient driven from his home because of the suspension of a benefit program is likely
to be attracted to another locality offering higher levels of assistance. If he obtains benefits in this
second locality, the total cost of assistance to the state is increased. See, e.g., Municipal Power,
supra note 38, at 700.
79 424 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
10 See notes 26-35 supra and accompanying text.
81 424 F. Supp. at 1188-89.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1187.
81 Id. at 1191.
s5 Id. at 1193.
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the repudiation by Summit County led directly to state responsibility for the
cost of the entire general relief program.
The Brown decision is open to still further criticism. Although the Ohio
Supreme Court did not identify the source of the doctrine of impossibility
other than by reference to State ex rel. Burgess v. Crabbe,8 the underlying
principle would appear almost certainly to have been drawn from the realm
of contract law. It is a generally recognized proposition of contract law that
"impossibility of performance excuses the promisor's duty" to perform.8 7 The
application of contract law in the context of state and local relations is not
warranted. No locality can claim that it has a contractual relationship with the
state or that any of its acts are protected from state interference by the
contract clause of the Federal Constitution.8 State governments cannot divest
themselves of the authority to govern by means of contractual agreements.89
Since impossibility is a doctrine born of mutual obligations enjoined by
contract, where no contract is permitted and where the sovereign power of
the state cannot be negated by agreement, use of the impossibility concept is
inappropriate.
One final criticism that may be levelled against the Brown decision
concerns its vagueness and failure to fashion any standard to guide the courts
in subsequent cases. Brown never specifies what constitutes an adequate
showing of impossibility. It never considers the salient fiscal indicia of
impossibility, alternative untapped sources of revenue, or any requirements
for good faith on the part of the over-spending locality. The courts are left to
pick their way through the tangled thicket of municipal finance with no
guidance. Variability of results is inevitable in future cases, and this
unpredictability will serve to exacerbate the difficulties faced by local and
state governments. The only reliable test, the genuine insolvency of the
locality, is nowhere utilized by the court.90
III. STATE LEGIsLATIvE AND JUDICIAL AUTHoRITY To COMPEL LOCAL
PARTICIPATION IN MANDATED PROGRAMS IN OHIO
Brown and the cases following it failed to take cognizance of a long line of
decisions in the Supreme Court of Ohio which have recognized the authority
of the state to compel local participation in obligatory state programs. One of
the earliest of these cases was State ex rel. Southard v. City of Van Wert,91 in
which the state director of public health sought to compel the City of Van
Wert to comply with state directives concerning the disposal of city sewage.
In an answer strikingly similar to the one interposed in Brown, the city
claimed that all available funds were needed "to pay the operating expenses
of the city and to retire an already existing debt," that no funds were available
s6 114 Ohio St. 517, 151 N.E. 759 (1926).
87 L. SMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs 359 (2d ed. 1965).
88 See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 176-77 (1907); City of Safety Harbor v.
Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (1976). See generally Schulz, supra note 44.
89 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23 (1917).
90 See generally Municipal Debt Adjustment, supra note 5 at 201.
91 126 Ohio St. 78, 184 N.E. 12 (1932).
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to meet increased sewage disposal costs, and that the city could not raise
additional revenue without violating the fiscal limitations imposed by the
Ohio Constitution and Ohio General Code.9 2 The state director filed a general
demurrer to these claims, and the case was then considered by the Ohio
Supreme Court. The court noted the mandatory nature of the state-ordered
expenditures in issue and the authority of the state to require their payment
notwithstanding the "home rule" provision of the Ohio Constitution.93 The
court then turned its attention to the assertion that no funds were available to
meet sewage disposal costs because all resources had already been committed
to other projects. In rejecting this argument, the court held that state spending
mandates took precedence over all "current expenses" save "bonded
indebtedness" and that sewer costs had to be met unless taxing and revenue
resources were absolutely exhausted in an effort to repay municipal
indebtedness. 94 The court recognized the authority of the Ohio General
Assembly to require localities to pay state-imposed costs even if such
payments caused the disruption of local government programs, stating
"[t]hat the Legislature may impose upon a municipality the performance of
certain duties of a public nature, and require it either to raise moneys for that
purpose or to devote to it revenues already on hand, is well recognized."95
The court in Southard specifically rejected the proposition eventually
espoused in Brown: that expenditure to operate local offices could be made in
lieu of appropriations to satisfy a state-imposed obligation. Southard further
required that a showing be made that maximum local tax and revenue efforts
were being made and that all funds were being used to meet existing
mandatory expenses before suspension of a state-mandated program would
be contemplated. 9 The Brown court did not consider either of these factors.
The Southard court recognized and respected the power of the General
Assembly to compel expenditures in all situations save insolvency. It is
indeed unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Ohio never discussed
Southard, its progeny,97 or the policy underlying them in the Brown decision.
In State ex rel. Motter v. Atkinson,9" the Ohio Supreme Court enforced a
92 Id. at 79, 184 N.E. at 13.
93 Id. at 81, 184 N.E. at 14.
94 Id. at 84-85, 184 N.E. at 15.
9- Id. at 85, 184 N.E. at 15.
96 Id. at 84-85, 184 N.E. at 15.
97 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hartung v. City of Springfield, 132 Ohio St. 590 (1937) (probable
financial hardship is not a defense for municipal refusal to comply with state health department
regulations); State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203,215,34 N.E.2d 219,225 (1941) ("It is
no defense in an action for mandamus, which, if granted, would require a city to incur expense in
carrying out some public duty, to say that compliance would leave the city without sufficient
funds for other purposes.")
Cf. City of Cleveland ex rel. Neelon v. Locher, 25 Ohio St. 2d 49, 266 N.E.2d 831 (1971), in
which the City of Cleveland refused to enact a statute effectuating a provision of the city charter
which would limit the work week of firemen, among others, to 48 hours. The city claimed that the
nature of firefighting made such hour limitations impossible. The court rejected this argument
and compelled passage of the required statute. The court stated that "[t]he charter provision is
clear on its face. If, because of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the operation of the fire
department, such a work week is not feasible, the remedy lies in an amendment of the charter, not
in a refusal to comply with the present clear dictates of the charter provision." Id. at 52, 266
N.E.2d at 834.
91 146 Ohio St. 11, 63 N.E.2d 440 (1945).
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state mandate requiring local support for juvenile justice services. Atkinson
is just one of many cases which have compelled local expenditures for state
programs benefitting juveniles notwithstanding a local desire to repudiate
them. One of the earliest of these cases was State ex rel. Clarke v. Board of
Commissioners99 in which Judge Clarke requested $1,800 from the Lawrence
County Board of Commissioners to run the county juvenile court. The
commissioners refused to make an appropriation and declared that there
were "no unappropriated or available funds."100 At a hearing, the
commissioners proved that Lawrence County had appropriated all available
funds to pay for operations other than those of the juvenile court, that revenue
had decreased substantially in relation to prior years and that appropriations
for all county offices except one had been reduced significantly.' 0' Because of
these facts, the county argued that it could not meet the demands of the
juvenile court and sought permission to repudiate its statutory obligation. In
language very similar to that employed in Southard, the supreme court
required the county commissioners to appropriate the mandated funds. The
court recognized the "increasing solicitude on the part of the state for
wayward unfortunate and neglected children"'102 and emphasized the
importance of meeting their problems by an effective statewide juvenile
justice program. The court held that the state statute compelled county
appropriations and had to be honored. The court thereby rejected
repudiation based upon local fiscal difficulties as antithetical to paramount
state interests and dangerous to the structure of government. As the court
stated:
To maintain the orderly processes of government it is incumbent
upon courts to give effect to the statutory law as written, when no
question of constitutionality is involved. If Section 1639-57, General
Code, in its present wording is unfair and detrimental to the other
branches of the county government in that it gives undue preference
to one department, rectification is for the General Assembly and not
for the courts. 103
The holding in Clarke has been reaffirmed frequently.10 4 In view of the
cases vigorously enforcing state-ordered expenditures for juvenile justice
services, it is difficult to justify the result reached by the supreme court in
State ex rel. Johns v. Board of County Commissioners.10 5 In Johns, the
99 141 Ohio St. 16, 46 N.E.2d 410 (1943).
100 Id. at 16, 46 N.E.2d at 411.
101 Id. at 17, 46 N.E.2d at 411.
102 Id. at 18, 46 N.E.2d at 412.
103 Id. at 20, 46 N.E.2d at 412.
"04 See, e.g., State ex rel. Motter v. Atkinson, 146 Ohio St. 11, 15, 63 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1945);
State ex rel. Foster v. Wittenberg, 16 Ohio St. 2d 89,90,242 N.E.2d 884,885 (1968); State ex rel.,
Moorehead v. Reed, 177 Ohio St. 4, 7, 201 N.E.2d 594,596 (1964). The Moorehead court stated,
"Respondent urges that there are no unappropriated or unencumbered funds out of which the
additional funds could be appropriated, and that to comply with relator's request would work an
undue hardship and burden on the other offices and agencies. This does not excuse respondent
from fuhilling its mandatory duty." Id. at 6.
10' State ex rel. Johns v. Board of County Commu'rs, 29 Ohio St. 2d 6, 278 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
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supreme court permitted repudiation because of a county's argument that it
was "operating at its maximum debt limit and that [it was] without funds
sufficient" to make required juvenile justice expenditures. 10 The state law
mandating such expenditures was clear, but the supreme court, following the
precedent of Brown, allowed county repudiation. No mention was made in
Johns of Clarke, of cases following it, of the importance of the juvenile justice
program to the state, or of the authority of the General Assembly to establish
priorities for the expenditure of local funds.10°
Were the matter to have rested there, the Johns decision would leave one
in a quandry over the continuing validity of Clarke and state authority to
mandate juvenile justice expenditures. However, approximately six months
after its decision in Johns, the Ohio Supreme Court appeared to reverse itself,
albeit sub silentio, in State ex rel. Milligan v. Freeman.108 In Freeman, the
court reaffirmed its holding in Clarke by compelling the Commissioners of
Stark County to fund the Stark County juvenile justice system at a level set by
the local domestic relations and juvenile court judges pursuant to state law.
The majority of the court did not discuss Johns or Brown. Justice Corrigan,
who had been the author of Brown, dissented without opinion. From this
dissenting vote it can be surmised that Justice Corrigan recognized the
inconsistency of Freeman with the decisions in Johns and Brown. Justice
Schneider, concurring in Freeman, attempted to distinguish Johns and Brown
on the grounds that the respondents in Freeman had neither specifically stated
in the pleadings that performance was impossible, as was allegedly the case in
Johns, nor that the expenditure would cause the collapse of county
government, as was allegedly the case in Brown.'°9 This proposed distinction
fails to take into account the fact that the county commissioners in Freeman
had clearly stated in their pleadings that if they were compelled to expend the
sums in issue their "attempt to finance properly the operation of the entire
county government structure" would be undermined." 0 Justice Schneider's
attempt to distinguish Brown and Johns from Freeman is also open to attack
because it fails to face the larger question raised by Freeman: whether
localities may repudiate state-mandated spending provisions. The majority
of the Ohio Supreme Court relied on and approved Clarke, Atkinson and their
progeny in deciding Freeman; all of these cases rejected well-pleaded
impossibility defenses. If Clarke and Atkinson were decided correctly, as the
majority in Freeman intimated, then Brown and Johns are inconsistent and
should not stand.
A review of Ohio cases demonstrates the existence of ample legislative and
judicial authority to determine spending priorities, to enforce those priorities,
106 Id. at 7, 278 N.E. 2d at 20.
107 Id.
108 31 Ohio St. 2d 13, 285 N.E.2d 352 (1972).
"o Id. at 19, 285 N.E.2d at 355-56. A close reading of the papers in Johns and Brown would
suggest that the characterizations utilized by Justice Schneider to describe these two cases are not
entirely accurate. For example, it is open to serious questions whether Franklin County was near
fiscal collapse in 1970. It had revenue of almost $14 million and mandated expenditures of under
$10 million. See Agreed Statement of Facts §§ 11 & 15, State ex rel. Brown v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 21 Ohio St. 2d 62, 255 N.E.2d 244 (1970).
11 State ex rel. MUlligan v. Freeman, 31 Ohio St. 2d 13, 16, 285 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1972).
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and to prohibit selective repudiation. The Ohio Supreme Court has on
several occasions identified the socially destructive consequences of local
selective repudiation and has prohibited repudiation in areas as diverse as
sewage treatment and juvenile justice. Based upon these decisions, the
validity of the decisions in Brown and Johns must be seriously questioned.
IV. THE DEFENSE OF IMPOsSIBILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Courts in a number of jurisdictions outside Ohio have prohibited local
repudiation of state obligations. Faced with a severe economic crisis which
brought Erie County, New York "perilously close to default on its financial
commitments" and which "require[d] drastic cuts in spending programs as
well as a substantial real property tax increase," '' county officials refused to
appropriate funds to run social welfare programs. The Commissioner of the
New York State Department of Social Services thereupon sued the county
officials, demanding that they make the required appropriation. The
Appellate Division of New York Supreme Court held in Toia v. Regan"' that
the county had to make its appropriation for social services notwithstanding
its fiscal woes." 3 The court carefully analyzed and then rejected the claim of
the county that it could not lawfully obtain sufficient funds to pay mandated
welfare expenses. The court rejected this assertion in large part because the
county had failed to demonstrate that it was taxing at the maximum allowable
rate." 4 As an alternative argument, the county claimed that it was an
independent political entity vested with the authority to determine its
expenditures without interference from the state. In response to this claim,
the court stated that "[i]mplicit in the county officials' argument is the
assertion that the general right to effective self government is inviolate and
that the State may not pass legislation which may to some extent interfere with
that right. We do not, however, agree." 15 The court identified a statewide
public interest in insuring the maintenance of the welfare program. In
rejecting selective repudiation, it compelled county expenditure. The lower
court's ruling was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, 18 and has been
followed in a subsequent case." 7
The courts of California also have compelled localities to fund welfare
programs despite local financial problems. In Mooney v. Pickett"8 the
" Toia v. Regan, 54 App. Div. 46,387 N.Y.S.2d 309, aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d837,356 N.E.2d276,387
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1976).
112 Id.
113 87 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
114 387 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
115 Id.
116 Toia v. Regan, 40 N.Y.2d 837, 354 N.E.2d 276, 387 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1976).
"' See Toia v. Schueler, 55 App. Div. 2d 621,389 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1976). See also Van Derzee v.
City of Long Beach, 265 App. Div. 1059, 39 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1943). In Van Derzee the Appellate
Division compelled the payment of bonded indebtedness notwithstanding a claim of extreme
fiscal hardship. The court stated that ,'[i]n view of the mandatory provisions of the section in
question, hardship is no defense to the payment of interest by the city on its indebtedness to
petitioner." 39 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
,11 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
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Supreme Court of California unanimously ordered San Mateo County to
provide general assistance to eligible employable single men. The county
had claimed that it could not afford to provide such assistance." 9 Justice
Tobriner, speaking for the court, stated:
We are aware of the financial difficulties which attend present
welfare programs on local, state, and national levels. This Court,
however, is not fitted to write a new welfare law for the State of
California and while the legislature addresses itself to that task it
remains our task to enforce the existing law. 121
Mooney is one of many California cases that have recognized the mandatory
nature of state welfare provisions, and that have enforced state welfare laws
to insure continuing public assistance to the poor without interruption
because of local fiscal difficulties. 12'
The actions of the New York and California courts contrast sharply with
the decision in Brown. The most notable differences are the failure of the
Supreme Court of Ohio to consider the tax rate in use in the locality seeking to
repudiate, to appreciate the importance of maintaining a $tatewide welfare
program in operation, or to recognize the plenary power of state government
to deal with a problem that is statewide in scope.
Outside the welfare context, courts in a number of states have compelled
localities to carry out state-mandated duties despite claims of fiscal
impossibility. In a case similar to Southard, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the argument that a locality could repudiate its
obligation to construct sewage treatment plants. The court held in
Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of Confluence122 that a
locality's defense that its sewage treatment plans had been "frustrated
because of [its] inability to raise the necessary funds . . .by any method
authorized by law"' 23 was insufficient to excuse performance. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court carefully examined the allegations made by the
locality about its economic position, and determined that the locality had not
demonstrated that it had "exhausted every possible avenue in an effort to find
some way of financing this sewer construction.' ' 124 This, coupled with the
statewide importance of pollution control, led the court to reject local
repudiation. The Alessandroni court identified the fundamental flaws in the
arguments which urge courts to refuse to enforce state spending mandates.
n Id. at 680.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Payne, 8 Cal. 2d 563, 66 P.2d 658 (1937); City and
County of San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187,13 P.2d 912 (1932); Bellino v. Superior Court, 70
Cal. App. 3d 824,137 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1977); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. App. 3d 44,128 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1976). Summarizing the California cases, the San
Francisco v. Superior Court opinion states, "In each of these cases, the California Supreme Court
considered the plight of the taxpayers, but in each case concluded that their burdens were not so
grievous as to permit indigents, in the midst of plenty, to go hungry, cold and naked without
fault." 57 Cal. App.3d 47, at 128 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
122 427 Pa. 540, 234 A.2d 852 (1967).
123 Id., 234 A.2d at 853.
124 Id.
1978]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1978
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
If we were to hold that financial inability is a defense to an action in
mandamus, it would put our Court in the anomalous position of
rendering "futile and effectual" [sic] a clearly defined public policy
as enunciated by the legislature. . . .Furthermore, such a result
would render the courts of Pennsylvania powerless to implement
this legislative determination and in effect would sanction the
harmful discharge of sewage into the waters of the Common-
wealth.125
The concerns articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were clearly
appreciated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Southard but ignored without
explanation in Brown. Brown rendered the Ohio General Assembly's
mandate "futile" in Franklin County in 1970 and crippled judicial authority to
compel local compliance with the state welfare laws upon which many Ohio
residents depend for sustenance. While the Ohio Supreme Court deviated
from Southard without explanation in Brown, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has reaffirmed its Alessandroni holding. 26
In State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn,127 the Supreme Court of Missouri also
enforced state-mandated expenditures notwithstanding local claims of
extreme fiscal hardship. The City of St. Louis had refused to appropriate or
pay approximately $460,000 for the maintenance of the police department.
This amount had been requested as part of a $14 million budget by the
members of the Board of Police Commissioners who were authorized by state
law to fix mandatory spending levels.12  The city claimed that it could not
provide the requested funds because it was operating at a deficit and would
have to cripple other government departments if compelled to provide the
mandated funds to the police department.2 9 The court rejected the city's
argument and stated that "[t]he fact that the City operated at a deficit for the
first eleven months of the fiscal year, and the needs of its other departments
cannot be controlling or even persuasive here.' 30 The court required that the
appropriation be made and described the judicial function in such cases as a
review limited to a determination of whether the discretion of the Board had
been arbitrarily and unreasonably exercised. 131 This decision is consistent
with other Missouri holdings. 132
These cases, as well as those from other states,133 illustrate judicial
125 Id. 234 A.2d at 854 n.4.
126 See, e.g., Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); Dombrowski v. City of
Philadelphia, 431 Pa. 199, 245 A.2d 238 (1968). See also Tate v. Antosh, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 144,
281 A.2d 192 (1971).
127 326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1959).
128 Id. at 317-18.
129 Id. at 327.
130 Id.
1"1 Id.
132 See, e.g., State ex rel. Sanders v. Cervantes, 480 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1972); State ex rel.
Rothrum v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002,137 S.W.2d 532 (1940); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51,
175 S.W. 591 (1915).
'33 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 501,262 A.2d 881 (1970); Board of Educ.
v. Township Council, 48 N.J. 94, 223 A.2d 481 (1966); State ex rel. Kiesel's Estate v. Bishop, 129
Ore. 448, 127 P.2d 736 (1942).
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determination to enforce state spending obligations despite local claims of
impossibility. The argument of the Brown opinion that courts do not have
the authority to resolve such matters because of political or legal constraints is
untenable in the face of such precedents. Courts exercise such authority on a
regular basis in resolving all manner of state and local disputes.
Underlying the impossibility argument is the assumption, reasonable on its
face, that where there are no available funds, a mandate compelling
expenditure is useless or futile. The apparent reasonableness of this notion is
undercut by the cases that have enforced fiscal obligations against localities
claiming such conditions. As a first principle, these courts have stated that
localities claiming impossibility must prove their plight, must account for
each dollar of possible revenue, and must devote available funds to state
mandates on a priority basis. If funds can lawfully be raised or diverted to
meet mandates, these steps must be taken. In Brown and Johns, this first
principle was breached. In both cases the court did not even look at the
available revenue resources or at the spending priorities established by state
law.
A second principle established by cases which have rejected claims of
impossibility is that courts must enforce state mandates if the fabric of
government and the authority of the judiciary are to be preserved. Again and
again the courts of states other than Ohio have declined to adopt the doctrine
of impossibility because of its destructive impact upon legislative and judicial
authority.134 In contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown denied the
General Assembly the authority to designate spending priorities and to have
them enforced. It also deprived the courts of the authority to enforce clearly
enunciated state law.
Finally, it is remarkable to note that, despite anguished cries from
localities, when mandates have been enforced money has been found to make
required appropriations. Finding funds may be difficult or cause disloca-
tions, but it would appear that it can almost always be managed.135 In those
few cases where fiscal resources are simply not available, the defense of
impossibility would seem one of the least attractive solutions available.
Impossibility encourages local officials to utilize an ad hoc decision-making
process to determine the fate of programs designated as fundamental by the
state legislature. Such solutions may avert collapse temporarily, but they do
nothing to resolve the fundamental problems facing the locality and can play
havoc with carefully structured social benefit schemes.
A much wiser course for the judiciary to follow is to enforce local
obligations. If state mandates literally cannot be met, intense political
pressure is likely to be focused upon state lawmakers to fashion appropriate
solutions. This is apparently what happened when New York City
approached the brink of fiscal collapse and was "saved" by the State of New
York.136 The "bailout" of localities may not always be achieved in this
134 See notes 111-133 supra and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., State ex rel. Southard v. City of Van Wert, 126 Ohio St. 78, 184 N.E. 12 (1932);
Clark v. Board of County Comm'rs, 410 Ohio St. 16 (1943); Toia v. Regan, 54 App. Div. 46,387
N.Y.S.2d 309, aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 837, 356 N.E.2d 276, 387 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1976); Mooney v. Pickett,
4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 670, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
13' See generally Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DUVE L.J.
1119 (1976).
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manner, but, should collapse occur, the risk of economic injury is distributed
evenly among all local residents rather than being focused upon a disfavored
few whose programs are sacrified. If there is a total collapse, the recently
amended Article IX of the Bankruptcy Act" 7 provides a method to restore the
locality to fiscal health. If insolvency is the real issue, it should be approached
candidly and the laws enacted to deal with it should be utilized to the fullest.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of cases from Ohio and other states suggests that for at
least two reasons the Ohio Supreme Court was in error when it sanctioned the
local fiscally-motivated repudiation of state-mandated programs. First,
repudiation was approved by the supreme court without adequate
consideration of available resources and of priorities previously set for
spending of those resources. Second, the court's action undermined the
ability of the state legislature to establish statewide programs and the ability
of the judiciary to enforce such programs. These results suggest that a re-
examination of the holding in the Brown case is in order. Re-examination also
seems warranted in light of the cases from Ohio and other states which have
rejected the impossibility defense.
Were the Brown decision merely a technical aberration, its importance,
although not insignificant, would not be fundamental. Unfortunately, it may
be much more significant and troublesome. Because welfare recipients and
other insular minorities are often the target of local animosity, the courts must
be, and have been, especially diligent in enforcing state policies having the
effect of benefiting them. 38 The approach of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Brown is diametrically opposed to the special judicial function of protecting
minorities. If anything, the supreme court has assisted those seeking to
oppress the politically powerless. If a result such as that reached in Brown
were based on thorough factual analysis or were the product of prior
precedent, it might be beyond reproach. Brown is the product of neither. It
does not take into account either fundamental factual issues or pre-existing
law. For these reasons, it suggests a possible judicial animus against the poor.
That welfare expenditures are a great burden is clear. That they create
difficulty on the local level is also clear. But, to borrow an idea from a pre-
Brown opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, adjustment of these difficulties is
not vested in the courts but "is wholly within the province of the General
Assembly.' 3 9 By ignoring statutory law, precedent and fundamental factual
considerations, the court in Brown arrogated to itself improper powers. It, in
effect, exercised these powers to legislate out of existence the mandatory
requirements of the welfare law. That it had no authority to do so seems
clear. The court may have recognized as much in the Freeman case.
The Brown decision, however, remains an open invitation to local officials
to attempt to repudiate state-mandated obligations. At least in the welfare
117 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (Supp. 1977).
138 See generally Municipal Power, supra note 38, at 708-21; Blease, Civil Liberties and the
California Law of Preemption, 17 HAsriNGs L.J. 517, 560-68 (1966).
139 State ex rel. Motter v. Atkinson, 146 Ohio St. 11, 16, 63 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1945).
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context, there is still every possibility that repudiation will succeed. The
results are the victimization of a weak and insular minority which cannot
protect itself, and the demoralization of the law enforcement officers of the
state. Based upon the results in Brown, public officials refused in the recent
case in Summit County, Cain v. Birkel, even to bring a mandamus action to
challenge local repudiation. Because of Brown, general relief recipients were
deprived not only of public assistance but of the efforts of state officials to
enforce the law on their behalf. Such an erosion of the rule of law has the
most serious implications for government in Ohio.
At least one other conclusion that may be drawn from the Brown decision
is that it demonstrates the declining capability of localities to deal effectively
with the financial problems inherent in governing. Localities in Ohio have
had an increasingly hard time financing their operations. In the face of these
difficulties, no action has been taken to reform government financial
structures. The increased centralization of programs of all kinds, the
imposition of more programs and more costly programs, and the ever
increasing need for state and federal aid all suggest that management and
finance by local government units are now fiscally impractical. Despite our
fears of big government, we may no longer be able to afford the luxury of
localism, especially in government finance, since its costs apparently are
program disruption and suffering for the weakest members of society. The
advantages of localism are said to include efficiency, local freedom of choice
and power to innovate. 40 These are all substantially reduced when fiscal
crisis arises.' 41 We could perhaps return to an era of decentralization in
government but in our interdependent and highly coordinated society, this
seems both anachronistic and unlikely. Under prevailing conditions, the
wiser course would seem to be economic integration which casts the fiscal
burdens on the state. By allowing local repudiation of state mandates, the
Ohio Supreme Court takes pressure off the legislature to deal with the
problem, and permits the present system to limp listlessly along. That
enforcement is better than evasion and reform better than delay seems
apparent. The sooner the judiciary forces the legislature to take cognizance
of these problems and to work toward their solution the better for all
concerned.
140 See generally J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBuC EDUCATION
15 (1970). Although directing their attention primarily to public schooling in America, the authors
of this volume fully discuss the advantages alleged to arise because of local governance.
141 In a fiscal crisis there are no resources available for innovation, program choices are
reduced or foreclosed and efficiency is rendered virtually meaningless.
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